An economy for flow control in computer networks

Abstract

This paper presents a flow control mechanism based on an economic model of optimum decentralized decision making. The virtual circuits (VCs) of the network are considered as economic agents competing for link capacity resources. Each VC is equipped with a preference relation defining its individual throughput-delay goals. VCs are endowed with certain budgets which they use to purchase capacity resources in a purely competitive economy. Prices of link capacities are iteratively adjusted to reach an equilibrium of supply and demand. The paper makes 3 contributions to the study of flow control protocols. First, it presents fully decentralized flow control algorithms that allocate capacity to reflect both, varying priorities among VCs as well as their varied preferences and needs. Second, we establish that the flow control algorithms result in Pareto-optimal allocation of capacities. This implies that the algorithms accomplish optimally fair allocation of resources given the set priorities and preferences. Third, experimental evidence is provided. that the algorithms converge rapidly. © 1989 IEEE.